Article 6 of 10 · FIDIC Compliance by Design
Development banks lend on the condition that every dollar can be traced and every decision defended. On a FIDIC contract they finance, integrity is not a value statement: it is a contract term, an audit right and a sanctions risk for every firm in the supply chain. Annual audits find fraud after the money has gone. A PMIS designed for the purpose makes the irregular transaction hard to make and easy to see, while it can still be stopped.
Every capital project carries a fraud risk, and few organisations have the courage to say so out loud. On a project financed by a development bank the subject cannot be avoided: it is written into the bidding documents, the contract and the financing agreement, and the consequences fall not only on individuals but on the borrower, the implementing agency and every firm that touched the transaction.
The integrity provisions sit in several places. The World Bank’s Standard Procurement Document for Works places the Bank’s policy on corrupt and fraudulent practices in Part C of the Particular Conditions, alongside the Contract Data in Part A and the Specific Provisions in Part B, and gives the Bank the right to inspect and audit accounts and records. The FIDIC MDB Harmonised Edition, the “Pink Book” still used on many Bank-funded contracts, added Sub-Clause 1.15 on the Bank’s inspection and audit of the Contractor’s accounts and records, and Sub-Clause 15.6 on corrupt or fraudulent practices. Under the 2017 General Conditions, Sub-Clause 15.2 already lists bribery and corrupt inducement among the grounds on which the Employer may terminate for the Contractor’s default.
Read together, these provisions ask a project for five things:
What makes a Bank-funded project different is the third party. A lender with the power to suspend disbursement, and, under Pink Book Sub-Clause 16.2, thereby to trigger the Contractor’s own right to terminate, will be looking at the evidence.
Most projects meet these obligations with a declaration form at award, an annual audit, and the hope that the email and document archive will hold up if anyone asks. The audit is useful, but it is structurally late. It finds the irregularity after it has been paid, when the evidence has had months to decay and the money is hard to recover. Prevention, meaning a process designed so that the irregular transaction is difficult to make and easy to see, is far more valuable and far cheaper.
There is a second, quieter problem. Many projects believe they are digitalised because they run a document management system, a correspondence platform or a common data environment. Those tools are valuable for what they were designed to do, but they were not designed as a project management information system. They record that a document was uploaded. They do not enforce who may approve a variation of what value, check that a payment application matches the quantities measured, or stop a commitment from being split to stay below an approval threshold. The result is a false sense of control: the appearance of digital governance without its substance. On a Bank-funded project, that gap is exactly where integrity failures hide.

PMWEB treats integrity as a property of the process. Five controls do most of the work, and each produces its own evidence.
Eligibility gates on every party. In PMWEB every subcontractor and supplier is a company record before it can hold a commitment. Subcontractor approval under Sub-Clause 5.1 is configured as a workflow with a mandatory step recording the check of the Bank’s list of debarred firms, the beneficial ownership declaration where the project requires it, and the firm’s integrity undertakings, each attached to the company record with the date and the name of the person who performed it. Material approvals carry a country-of-origin field, so the eligible source country requirement is evidenced when the material is approved, not reconstructed at the final account.
Delegation of Authority enforced, not documented. A DoA matrix in a policy manual prevents nothing. A DoA matrix configured in PMWEB Workflow does. Approval levels are set by process, value and project, and the Engineer’s actions that the Particular Conditions reserve for the Employer’s consent, under Sub-Clause 3.2 of the 2017 edition or Sub-Clause 3.1 of the Pink Book, route automatically to the Employer before the Engineer can act. A user cannot approve outside their authority because the system never presents them the step.
Segregation of duties. The person who raises a commitment does not approve it; the person who measures quantities does not certify payment; the person who requests a budget transfer does not authorise it. Role-based security and workflow design make these separations structural. Conflict-of-interest declarations are captured on a custom form for every member of evaluation, certification and approval teams, and a declared conflict removes that user from the relevant workflow.
An audit trail no one can edit. Every PMWEB record carries its full history, with comments, and attachments are versioned in Document Management. This is the record the Bank’s auditors need, produced as a by-product of the work rather than as a separate compliance exercise that someone may be tempted to tidy up.
Retention and the evidence pack. Because the contract, its correspondence, approvals, payments and supporting documents are linked in one system, PMWEB produces an audit-ready evidence pack for any contract on demand. When the Bank exercises its inspection and audit rights, the response is measured in hours, not weeks, and the speed itself signals control.

The controls above stop the obvious irregularity. The harder cases are patterns: a series of small commitments to the same supplier that together exceed an approval threshold; two progress invoices with the same amount and description in different periods; quantities claimed for an item that run far ahead of planned progress; variations clustered just below a no-objection threshold; approvals concentrated in a single user. Each transaction looks acceptable on its own. Together they deserve a question.
PMWEB 2026, rebuilt on Angular with AI embedded, opens the door to use cases that review the structured data PMWEB already holds and flag such patterns for a human reviewer. A flag is not an accusation. It is a prompt for the integrity officer, the Engineer or the PIU’s internal auditor to look more closely while the transaction is still open. AI can only reason over data that exists in structured form, which is why the discipline described in this series comes first: no data, no AI.

The dashboard below is built in PMWEB’s embedded Power BI reporting for the sample programme P-2100, with values in USD millions.

Action is taken only with the user’s approval, and PMWEB AI honours security settings, so integrity data, and especially open investigations, is visible only to the roles permitted to see it.
Over to you: On a Bank-funded project, would you rather defend your controls to an auditor after the payment, or have the system stop the irregular transaction before it is approved?
The series: Article 1, Funding Comes with Conditions; Article 2, From Particular Conditions to Platform; Article 3, The First 90 Days; Article 4, ESHS as Evidence; Article 5, People on Site; Article 6, Integrity by Design; Article 7, Change under Scrutiny; Article 8, Paying through the Loan; Article 9, Reporting to the Bank; Article 10, Closing the Contract, Closing the Loan.
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